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The Autumn Wind is a Raider
Pillaging just for fun
He'll knock you 'round and upside down
And laugh when he's conquered and won.'
I. Introduction
To many, John Facenda was the voice of Philadelphia news;2 to
others, he was the "Voice of God.",3 Facenda was a Philadelphia
news and television broadcaster between the 1940s and 1970s, but
earned national fame after joining the NFL Films team.4 As an NFL
Films employee, Facenda narrated nationally broadcast highlight
films and quickly earned the nickname "voice of God" because of his
1. Oakland Raiderfans Network, Your Raiders Port-O-Call, http://www.raiderfans.
com/staticpages/index.php?page=20060905081456607 (last visited Aug. 27, 2009)
(providing lyrics, credits, and sound file for "The Autumn Wind"). The Oakland Raiders
adopted Facenda's reading of "The Autumn Wind" as its unofficial theme song.
This case brief concludes that plaintiffs raid like the Autumn Wind. It explores
the Third Circuit's analysis and discusses plaintiffs' "home field advantage" when raising
false endorsement claims under Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act.
2. For much of his career, John Facenda was "the King of Philadelphia news." The
Broadcast Pioneers of Philadelphia, http://www.broadcastpioneers.com/johnfacenda.html
(last visited Aug. 27, 2009) (recognizing Facenda's notoriety in Philadelphia). In 1954, TV
Guide readers voted him "The Local Personality Most Worthy of Network Recognition."
See John Facenda - Biography, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0264840/bio (last visited
Aug. 27, 2009) (noting Facenda's achievement). In 1984, the Philadelphia chapter of the
National Academy of Television Arts and Sciences presented Facenda with the Governors
Award for Lifetime Achievement. See id. Although born in Portsmouth, Virginia,
Facenda grew up in the Philadelphia area and, for a short time, attended Villanova
University's engineering program. See The Broadcast Pioneers of Philadelphia, supra
(chronicling Facenda's life before he began broadcasting).
3. See Posting of Dan Slater to Wall Street Journal Law Blog, http://blogs.wsj.coml
law/2008/06/09/voice-of-god-case-yields-lively-argument-down-in-philly/ (June 9, 2008,
10:02 EST) (noting that lawsuit brought by Facenda's estate was known colloquially as
"The Voice of God" case); John Facenda - Biography, supra note 2; Shannon P. Duffy, 3d
Circuit Judges Pepper Counsel With Questions in "Voice of God" Case, THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, June 9, 2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=
1202422023235.
4. John Facenda - Biography, supra note 2 (detailing how Facenda secured his
position with NFL films and noting that "his rich, dramatic voice [was] a perfect
complement to the long passes, thrilling runs and violent line play."). Interestingly,
Facenda fell into his career with NFL Films after accidental meeting with company
founder Ed Sabol. Id.
deep-voiced, methodical, and passionate readings.' His voice was and
remains synonymous with the NFL6
Because of his widespread following, NFL Films had Facenda sign
a release shortly before his death authorizing the company to use his
audio sequences for any purpose other than endorsement.7
Nevertheless, in Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc., John Facenda Jr.-on
behalf of his father's estate-sued NFL Films and related parties for
false endorsement under the Lanham Act.8 NFL Films had used a
small portion of Facenda's earlier voice-over work in a television
program promoting the popular video game "Madden NFL 06."9 The
estate claimed that NFL Films' use of Facenda's voice constituted a
false endorsement of the video game.' °  On cross-motions forsummary judgment, the district court found the use of Facenda's
5. Lost Treasures of NFL Films: NFL Films Style (ESPN Classic television broadcast
Dec. 12, 2002) (summary available at http://www.tv.comlost-treasures-of-nfl-films/nfl-
films-styleiepisode/307742/summary.html?tag=ep-guide;summary)) (noting Facenda's gift
for narration). Steve Sabol, son of NFL Films founder Ed Sabol, once commented that
Facenda "may have made a game seem more important than it was because he read the
lines with a dramatic directness." Id. Magistrate Judge Hart, in the district court opinion
in this case, noted that "although John Facenda is not a 'legend' in the same category as,
say, Hercules, or John Henry, Plaintiff has shown that he was, and remains, a very popular
figure among football fans; that he was strongly associated with NFL [sic] Films." Facenda
v. NFL Films (Facenda I), 488 F. Supp. 2d 491, 495 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
6. See Lee Winfrey, John Facenda Dies; Eminent Anchorman, THE PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Sept. 27, 1984, at Al, available at http://www.geocities.com/TelevisionCity/
Studio/2020/facenda.html (stating that Facenda was "the very voice of pro football, the
chronicler of gridiron greatness for millions of nationwide listeners who maybe never even
knew his name.").
7. Facenda 1, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 495 (noting that before Facenda's death in 1984, he
signed release which gave NFL Films "unequivocal" rights to his previously recorded
audio works "in perpetuity and by whatever media or manner NFL [sic] Films, Inc., sees
fit, provided, however, such use does not constitute an endorsement of any product or
service.").
8. Id. at 493. Facenda's original complaint also included charges of invasion of
privacy under Pennsylvania common law and "right of publicity" under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 8316 (2008). Nevertheless, this casebrief addresses only the false endorsement claim and
related defenses.
9. Id. at 495. The popularity of the John Madden video game series is best
demonstrated by its longevity; in 2008, Madden celebrated the twentieth anniversary of
the game's original release and the release of the twentieth version (update) of the series.
Mike Snider, As John Madden would say, 'Boom!' His NFL game turns 20, USA TODAY,
Aug. 6, 2008 at 01D, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/gaming/2008-08-05-
madden-game-mainN.htm (noting that, since 2005, game series has been among top game
franchises each year and has grossed over $2.4 billion); see also ESPN.com, Madden
Nation 4, http://sports.espn.go.com/videogames/news/story?id=3047668 (last visited Aug.
27, 2009) (chronicling fourth season of television show "Madden Nation 4," which tracks
men who compete in "Madden" video game showdown).
10. Facenda I, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 493, 503-04.
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voice to be in violation on the Lanham Act." NFL Films appealed,
arguing that the estate failed to meet its burden of proof and,
alternatively, that the Lanham Act presented an unconstitutional
restriction on commercial speech.'2 While the Third Circuit rejected
both arguments, it vacated the summary judgment and remanded the
case on other grounds. 3
This case brief identifies the Third Circuit's analysis in false
endorsement cases and serves as a guide for practitioners bringing or
defending such claims. Part II of this case brief presents an overview
of trademark law, the history and need for the Lanham Act in
governing false endorsement claims, and the case precedent which
informed the Third Circuit's Facenda opinion. Part III discusses the
Third Circuit's newly adopted eight factor test for likelihood of
confusion in false endorsement cases, and the methodology and
analysis that Third Circuit courts will use when defendants raise First
Amendment defenses. Finally, Part IV discusses approaches that
practitioners may use in trying such cases.
A. Learning the Game, Play by Play: Basic Terminology, Relevant
Precedent, and Defenses Against Lanham Act Claims
Although the nation's founders foresaw the need to protect some
intellectual property-namely, patents and copyrights-they did not
foresee a need to protect trademarks." As a result, states freely
enacted their own trademark laws and state courts were bound by
such legislation. Federal courts, on the other hand, relied upon the
federal common law in their review of trademark cases because
Congress had abstained from enacting federal trademark laws. 6
11. Id. at 493.
12. Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc. (Facenda II), 542 F.3d 1007,1014-15 (3d Cir. 2008).
13. Id. at 1033.
14. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8 ("The Congress shall have power... [t]o promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited time to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."); ARTHUR H. SEIDEL, ET
AL., WHAT THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT TRADEMARKS AND
COPYRIGHT LAW 1 (6th ed. 1992) (noting founders' failure to provide for trademark
protections in U.S. constitution).
15. See 1 CHARLES E. MCKENNEY & GEORGE F. LONG III, FEDERAL UNFAIR
COMPETITION: LANHAM ACT § 43(A) § 1:2 (2009) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 944, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. 4 (1939)) (noting state common-law control of power to strengthen and regulate
trademarks).
16. See generally Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842) (recognizing federal court's power
to rely on substantive federal common law in diversity actions). However, in Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Supreme Court struck down the notion of federal
common law, overturning the Swift doctrine. 32 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 372 (2008).
HASTINGS COMM]ENT L.J. [32:1
Congress' first attempts to enact trademark laws were overturned as
unconstitutional. 7
Following the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,' 8 Congress changed the rules of the game."
Congress signed the Lanham Act into law in 1946, breathing new life
into the federal government's power to regulate trademarks and
related issues.20  Congressional authority to regulate trademarks
stemmed from the authority to regulate interstate commerce.2 1
Today, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides broad
protections against trademark infringement, false endorsement oradvetisng, nd nfai .. 22
advertising, and unfair competition. To better understand the
protections offered by the Lanham Act, and the elements required to
successfully pursue a false endorsement claim, one must understand
what trademarks are and why the Lanham Act is necessary. This
section, in turn, offers a definition of trademarks, explains trademark
law and The Lanham Act, and provides guidance as to relevant
federal case precedent.
17. Connecticut Legal Information Portal: CLIP Guides, Trademark Law, at 3,
http://www.law.uconn.edu/system/files/private/trademark_0.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2009).
Subsequent trademark laws were passed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
but were limited in scope. Id. For a compilation of the proposed bills and Congressional
reports for trademark law between 1925 and the 1988 amendment to the Lanham Act,
refer to the Franklin Pierce Law Center: IP Mall, Legislative IP Acts/History Archive:
Trademark, http://ipmall.info/hosted-resources/lipa/lipa-trademarks-index.asp (last
visited Feb. 16, 2009) (providing links to trademark legislation documentation).
18. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
19. McKENNEY & LONG III, supra note 15, at § 1:2 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 944, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1939)) (noting that Committee on Trademarks and Patents called for
creation of federal trademark statute after Erie). The Committee recognized that a
national economy required uniform trademark laws, holding that, "[i]t would seem as if
national legislation along national lines securing to the owners of trademarks in interstate
commerce definite rights should be enacted and should be enacted now." Id.
20. See Ethan Horwitz and Benjamin Levi, Fifty Years of the Lanham Act: A
Retrospective of Section 43(a), 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 59, 60-64
(1996).
21. See SEIDEL, ET AL., supra note 14, at 2 (6th ed. 1992) (noting that federal
trademark laws are based upon Constitution's interstate commerce clause). As Seidel
notes, "since its passage in 1946, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act has played an
increasingly pivotal role in the resolution of trademark and unfair competition claims
adjudicated in the federal courts." Id. at 3.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2008). Claims arising under Section 43 fall under the general
heading of "Unfair Competition." See generally McKenney & Long III, supra note 15
(detailing various kinds of Section 43 claims, and elements of and precedent for each).
For a description of Section 43 as it pertains to false endorsement, see infra notes 30-48
and related text.
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1. Before You Memorize the Playbook, You Separate Xs From Os: A
Definition of Trademarks
A trademark is "any word, name, symbol or device adopted and
used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and
distinguish them from those manufactured and sold by others." 3 The
terms "symbol" and "device" should be broadly interpreted. 24 As
Justice Frankfurter observed in Mishawaka Manufacturing. Co. v.
Kresge. Co.:
The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of
the psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live
by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them.
A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a
purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to
believe he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human
propensity by making every effort to impregnate the
atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a
congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed, the aim is
the same-to convey through the mark, in the minds of
potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon
23. See MCKENNEY & LONG III, supra note 15, at § 3:2 (citations omitted) (providing
traditional definition of trademarks). By comparison, the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office defines trademarks as "a word, phrase, symbol or design, or a combination of
words, phrases, symbols or designs, that identifies and distinguishes the source of the
goods of one party from those of others" and distinguishes them from service marks. U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, "Trademark, copyright or patent?", http://www.uspto.govl
go/tac/doc/basic/tradedefin.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
24. See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205
(1942) (recognizing trademarks as symbols by which manufacturers and merchants
communicate value or other characteristics of products and services); Waits v. Frito-Lay,
Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing broad judicial interpretation of
terms name, symbol, and device); Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 206 F.2d 144, 145-46
(3d Cir. 1953) (defining trademarks). In Q-Tips, the Third Circuit gave a broader
definition, stating that a trademark is
any mark, word, letter, number, design, picture or combination thereof in
any form of arrangement, which (a) is adopted and used by a person to
denominate goods which he markets, and (b) is affixed to the goods, and
(c) is not ... a common or generic name for the goods or a picture of
them, or a geographical, personal, or corporate or other association
name, or a designation descriptive of the goods or of their quality,
ingredients, properties or functions.
which it appears. Once this is attained, the trademark owner
has something of value.25
So long as a mark, symbol, or device is strongly associated with a
particular product, it will be recognized and treated as a trademark.26
The protections offered by trademark law are extended to both
the owner of the trademark and to consumers.27 To determine the
scope of a trademark-that is, how great the protections afforded
should be-courts must determine the likelihood of confusion
between the trademark at issue and the trademark from another
company or person.2' As one court explained, "[t]here is no litmus
rule which can provide a ready guide to all cases."29
2. History of, and Need for, the Lanham Act
a. History of the Lanham Act
Congress passed the Lanham Act in 1946 to modernize trademark
laws to keep pace with modern business practice. 30 Further, Congress
intended to provide a bar against unfair competition and, accordingly,
wrote the Lanham Act to: "(1) allow customers to identify a product's
manufacturer or sponsor, and (2) enable producers to differentiate
25. 316 U.S. at 205 (emphasis added).
26. See MCKENNEY & LONG, supra note 15, at § 3:2 (demonstrating that strength of
association between marks or symbols, and related products or services, determines scope
of trademark protection).
27. See Malletier v. Dooney & Burke, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 368, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(observing that trademark infringements have adverse effects on both owner of trademark
and confused consumers); see also Joshua Beser, False Endorsement or First Amendment?:
An Analysis of Celebrity Trademark Rights and Artistic Expression, 41 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1787, 1792-93 (2004) (discussing importance of titles within entertainment industry).
Beser explained, "[t]itles have two purposes: to catch the eye and to promote the value of
the underlying work. Ordinary trademark infringement requires labels to refrain from
misleading or confusing the public as to the good's source. Consumers are protected
insofar as they can identify what they buy." Id.
28. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 24:6 (4th ed. 2009) (defining scope of trademarks by noting that
likelihood of confusion "encompasses any type of confusion, including: confusion of
source; confusion of sponsorship; confusion of affiliation; or confusion of connection.").
Courts may further extend the scope of trademarks to cover the mark and any reputation
or goodwill associated with it. See NERMIEN AL-ALI, COMPREHENSIVE INTELLECTUAL
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 271 (2003).
29. Application of E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361-62 (C.C.P.A.
1973) (demonstrating need for case-by-case review for likelihood of confusion).
30. See MCKENNEY & LONG III, supra note 15, at § 1:2 (quoting Vidal Sassoon, Inc.
v. Bristol-Meyers Co., 661 F.2d 272, 276 (2d Cir. 1981)).
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the[ir] product[s and services] from others [available for purchase]."'"
Congress thus protected both registered and unregistered
trademarks. 32
Soon after the Lanham Act's passage, federal courts recognized
the need for more expansive protections than those found within the
Act.33  Accordingly, courts expanded their reading of the text of
Section 43(a), generally, and 43(a)(1)(A), specifically, to offer greater
trademark protection. '  In the forty-two years between the Act's
inception and its amendment, federal courts expanded the list of
wrongs cognizable under Section 43.35 The federal judiciary
consistently read more power into the Lanham Act than existed in its
text.36
Accordingly, Congress amended the Act in 1988. 37  Justice
Stevens commented that the amendment recognized and codified
31. Beser, supra note 27, at 1795. The Supreme Court has noted that the purposes of
the Lanham Act are to "make 'actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks' and
'to protect persons engaged in... commerce against unfair competition."' Two Pesos, Inc.
v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 767-68 (1992).
32. Beser, supra note 27, at 1796 (noting that Section 32(1) of Lanham Act protects
registered trademarks and section 43(a) of Lanham Act applies to unregistered marks);
see also SHELDON W. HALPERN, ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF UNITED STATES
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 381 (2007).
33. For examples of judicial legislation as it relates to the Lanham Act, see infra note
34 and related text.
34. Beser, supra note 27, at 1796 (noting that Sixth Circuit called for expansive
reading of Lanham Act, and particularly Section 43(a)). In Vidal Sassoon, the Second
Circuit court of appeals called for an expansive reading of the Act "lest rapid advances in
advertising and marketing methods outpace technical revisions in statutory language and
finally defeat the clear purpose of Congress in protecting the consumer." Vidal Sassoon,
661 F.2d at 277. For a discussion of Supreme Court recognition and, perhaps, approval of
expansive judicial interpretation of the act, see supra notes 38-40 and related text.
35. See MCKENNEY & LONG III, supra note 15, at § 1:2 (noting that federal courts
have read greater protections into Lanham Act than those actually found in text of Act).
36. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 780 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting federal courts'
expansion of protections offered under Lanham Act). Although some commentators felt
that the Lanham Act "never was intended to be a catch-all for all forms of unfair
competition which may involve some kind of false or unfair allegations," Justice Stevens
noted that the federal court's interpretation of the Act, and specifically section 43(a), was
consistent with legislative intent, and was therefore "appropriate for a national economy."
Walter J. Derenberg, Federal Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First decade of the
Lanham Act. Prologue or Epilogue?, 32 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1029, 1039-40 (1957). But see
McKENNEY & LONG III, supra note 15, at § 1:2 n.15 (discussing Justices Stevens and
Thomas' approval of judicial interpretation of section 43(a)).
37. MCKENNEY & LONG III, supra note 15, at § 1:3 (detailing changes to Section 43).
In Two Pesos, Inc., Justice Stevens acknowledged that Congress had accepted the
judiciary's call to action in enacting the 1988 amendments. 505 U.S. at 783 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
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federal case law.38 Further, Justice Stevens noted with approval that
the federal courts and the 1988 amendment gave plaintiffs greater
protection under the Lanham Act than previously existed."
Commentators have also recognized that the revised Section
43(a)(1)(A) explicitly provided protections for wrongs that earlier
federal courts had read into the Act.4° In pertinent part, Section 43 of
the revised Act reads:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods
or services... uses in commerce any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or
false or misleading representation of fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities.., shall be liable ....
Accordingly, Section 43(a) covers a wide range of unfair competition
claims, including, but not limited to, false endorsement.
b. Applying the Act
Since Congress passed the 1988 amendment to the Lanham Act,
false endorsement cases have become more prominent.43  Recent
38. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 784 n.18 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens noted
that Congress gave "its imprimatur to a growing body of case law from the Circuits that
had expanded the section beyond its original language." Id. at 783 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Although Two Pesos was decided in 1992, the case was raised based on
events that occurred before the 1988 amendment to the act. Id. at 776 (majority opinion).
Accordingly, the Court applied the pre-amendment law, as interpreted by the Federal
Courts. Id. at 766 nn.2-4.
39. Id. at 781 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Even though the lower courts' expansion of
the categories contained in 43(a) is unsupported by the text of the Act, I am persuaded
that it is consistent with the general purposes of the Act.").
40. MCKENNEY & LONG III, supra note 15, at § 1:3 (noting that 1988 changes to
Lanham Act "sought to codify ... the case law arising under Section 43(a)" and "expressly
extend[ed] protection to claims not previously actionable.").
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2008).
42. See id.; McKENNEY & LONG III, supra note 15, at § 7:1-13 (discussing celebrities
and media personnel in context of trademark claims, most notably false endorsement).
43. See SEIDEL, ET AL., supra note 14, at 3 (discussing importance of Lanham Act,
generally, and increased importance of Act since 1988 amendments created an
environment where "Section 43(a) now specifically applies to misleading and literally false
advertising....").
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false endorsement cases have been brought by celebrities, deceased
celebrities' estates, and the owners of fictional characters." Such
lawsuits often involved a physical likeness of a celebrity or parody
thereof." Others involved aural likenesses.1
6
44. See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 463 (6th Cir. 2003) (resolving
issue whether popular rappers "OutKast" infringed Rosa Parks' trademark or likeness by
naming song "Rosa Parks"); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th
Cir. 1992) (finding genuine issue of material fact whether advertiser's use of robot dressed
to look like Vanna White was either trademark infringement or false endorsement); Seale
v. Grammercy Pictures, 964 F. Supp. 918, 931 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (determining that use of
well-known Black Panther's likeness was not false advertising). For a more thorough list
and explanation of such cases, refer to MCKENNEY & LONG III, supra note 15, at § 7:2.
Such cases often involve only some aspect of the celebrity's likeness. See, e.g., White, 971
F.2d at 1396 (acknowledging trademark as model's physical likeness in specific context of
game show set).
For examples and discussion of cases dealing with deceased celebrities, see, e.g.,
Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 191 (5th Cir. 1998); Estate of Presley v.
Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981). As it relates to the power of a deceased
celebrity's estate to bring suit where another party uses the celebrity's likeness without
permission, the Russen court noted, "the right of an individual, especially a public figure
or a celebrity, to control the commercial value and exploitation of his name and picture or
likeness and to prevent others from unfairly appropriating this value for their commercial
benefit." 513 F. Supp. at 1353. See also Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1212,
1223 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (resolving trademark issues after Franklin Mint Co. used Princess
Diana's likeness, after her death and without her estate's permission, on set of commercial
commemorative plates).
Finally, for examples and discussion of cases dealing with fictional celebrities and
characters, see generally HIT Entm't, Inc. v. Nat'l Discount Costume Co., Inc., 552 F.
Supp. 2d 1099 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (resolving dispute between owners of intellectual property
in popular children's television characters, including "Bob the Builder," "Barney the
Dinosaur," and "Thomas the Tank Engine," and costume supplier who sold costumes of
these characters); Marvel Enters., Inc. v. NCSoft Corp., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 1303 (C.D. Cal.
2005) (resolving dispute between owner of comic book character "Captain America" and
possible trademark infringer); Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc. v. Fireworks Entm't Group, Inc.,
156 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (resolving trade dress dispute related to Zorro).
Those defending such trademark actions may have a more difficult case than attorneys
defending actions involving actual celebrities, because fictionalized characters often
represent the entirety of a trademark, whereas an actual celebrity's trademark is often
limited to select attributes (e.g., a model's stance). Compare HIT Entm't, 552 F. Supp. 2d
at 1101-02 (recognizing plaintiffs' trademarks in entirety of "Bob the Builder" and other
characters), with White, 971 F.2d at 1396 (acknowledging trademark as model's physical
likeness in specific context of game show set).
45. See White, 971 F.2d at 1396 (comparing Vanna White and robot made to look like
Vanna White); Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day and Night Co., Inc., 689 F.2d 317 (2d
Cir. 1982). Although decided before Congress passed the 1988 Lanham Act amendment,
Groucho Marx still serves as a valid example of a parody.
46. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (determining that
voice may be protectable as it is attributable to specific celebrity). Although Bette
Midler's action against Ford was successful, Midler did not raise her claim under Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act. See generally id. The last paragraph of the Ninth Circuit's
opinion, however, remains instructive:
The Third Circuit has articulated that plaintiffs who raise false
endorsement claims under Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act
must demonstrate that: (1) the plaintiff's mark is legally protectable;
(2) the plaintiff owns the mark; and (3) the defendant's use of the
mark to identify the defendant's own goods or services will likely
create (or has likely created) confusion as to the plaintiff's
47
endorsement or sponsorship of the defendant's goods or services.
Several circuits have clearly stated that the third element, likelihood
of confusion, must be determined on a case-by-case basis. 8 For
example, the Ninth Circuit, in Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch,
articulated a list of factors to consider for likelihood of confusion in
false endorsement cases.49  Leading up to Facenda, however, the
We need not and do not go so far as to hold that every imitation of a
voice to advertise merchandise is actionable. We hold only that when a
distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and is
deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have
appropriated what is not theirs and have committed a tort ....
Id. at 463. In this respect, Midler accords with other voice-emulation decisions and
traditional false endorsement claims stemming from use of physical likeness. See
MCKENNEY & LONG III, supra note 15, at § 7:3, nn.2-5 (citing Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970); Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir.
1962)) (discussing voice emulation in context of Section 43(a) celebrity likeness and false
endorsement claims).
47. Facenda II, 542 F.3d 1007, 1014 (3d Cir. 2008).
48. See, e.g., In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 1314-15 (Fed. Cir.
2003). As the court explained:
We determine likelihood of confusion by focusing on the question
whether the purchasing public would mistakenly assume that the
applicant's goods originate from the same source as, or are associated
with, the goods in the cited registrations. We make that determination
on a case-by-case basis ....
Id.
49. 265 F.3d 994, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 2001). Those factors are:
1. the level of recognition that the plaintiff has among the segment of
society for whom the defendant's product is intended;
2. the relatedness of the fame or success of the plaintiff to the
defendant's product;
3. the similarity of the likeness used by the defendant to the actual
plaintiff;
4. evidence of actual confusion;
5. marketing channels used;
6. likely degree of purchaser care;
7. defendant's intent on selecting the plaintiff; and
8. likelihood of expansion of the product lines.
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Third Circuit had not articulated such a ready set of factors0 to
determine whether likelihood of confusion was met." Instead, the
Third Circuit had only outlined factors for consideration under the
broader heading of Section 43(a) claims.
Generally, Third Circuit courts have recognized that claimants
under Section 43(a)(1)(A) must demonstrate only a likelihood of
confusion, whereas claimants under Section 43(a)(1)(B) must
demonstrate actual confusion.52 One district court opinion, however,
required proof of actual confusion in order to successfully bring a
claim under Section 43(a)(1)(A).53 This disparity between the courts
creates room for parties to argue that, under 43(a)(1)(A), the plaintiff
must show evidence of actual confusion. 4 This may be problematic
Although these are all factors that are appropriate for consideration in
determining the likelihood of confusion, they are not necessarily of equal
importance, nor do they necessarily apply to every case.
Id.
50. See Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983). Under the
Third Circuit test, the factors to consider when determining likelihood of confusion are:
(1) the degree of similarity between the owner's mark and the alleged
infringing mark; (2) the strength of the owner's mark; (3) the price of the
goods and other factors indicative of the care and attention expected of
consumers when making a purchase; (4) the length of time the defendant
has used the mark without evidence of actual confusion arising; (5) the
intent of the defendant in adopting the mark; (6) the evidence of actual
confusion; (7) whether the goods, though not competing, are marketed
through the same channels of trade and advertised through the same
media; (8) the extent to which the targets of the parties' sales efforts are
the same; (9) the relationship of the goods in the minds of consumers
because of the similarity of function; (10) other facts suggesting that the
consuming public might expect the prior owner to manufacture a product
in the defendant's market, or that he is likely to expand into that market.
Id.
51. See Facenda 11, 542 F.3d at 1019-20 (outlining factors to consider generally for
Section 43(a) claims, recognizing that such factors do not function adequately in context of
false endorsement claims, and outlining new list of factors to consider when examining
false endorsement claims). Generally, the Third Circuit had applied the Lapp factors to
claims arising under Section 43(a). Id. at 1019. Nevertheless, the court had not had an
opportunity until Facenda to annunciate a test specific to false endorsement claims. See id.
(noting question presented to court and district court's resolution of same).
52. See, e.g., Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 473 & n.8
(3d Cir. 1994).
53. Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 964 F. Supp. 918, 930 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
54. See, e.g., Facenda If, 542 F.3d at 1022 (demonstrating that defendants might rely
on Seale holding to require plaintiffs to bring proof of actual evidence to court). For
further discussion of the discrepancy created by the Seale opinion and the need for proof
of actual confusion (or lack thereof), see infra notes 118-20 and related text.
for plaintiffs, because proving actual confusion-most often through
survey evidence-involves a lengthy and very expensive process.5
3. A Good Defendant Is the Best Offense: Using the First Amendment to
Defend Claims Raised Under Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act
The First Amendment guarantees American citizens the right to
speech free from government interference. 6 Accordingly, defendants
have used the First Amendment to defend against false endorsement
cases raised under the Lanham Act by claiming that the Act is
effectually government interference with free speech. 7 This section
identifies relevant Supreme Court precedent for such defenses, and
explains the protections offered to different kinds of speech 8
Before 1975, commercial speech-speech which invites
participation in a commercial transaction-was offered little
protection under the First Amendment. 9  In 1975, however,
commercial speech garnered greater protections from the Supreme
Court in Bigelow v. Virginia60 and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.61 In these cases, the
Court held that speech that only proposes a commercial transaction-
55. Facenda I, 488 F. Supp. 2d 491, 513 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (noting difficulty and cost of
structuring and obtaining survey evidence). See also Facenda II, 542 F.3d at 1020.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech"). For First Amendment primers, see generally JOHN H. GARVEY AND
FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A READER (1996); THOMAS L.
TEDFORD AND DALE A. HERBECK, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (5th
ed. 2005). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recognized that the government may regulate
or ban certain types of speech. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. State of N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 571-72
(1942) (stating that "the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all
circumstances," and noting that "fighting words" are exempt from general rule); R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992) (noting that government may regulate areas
of speech which are "of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.").
57. See, e.g., Facenda II, 542 F.3d at 1015. For a more in-depth discussion of NFL
Film's First Amendment defense and the court's treatment and analysis of it, see infra
notes 96-115.
58. For discussion of Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent interpreting
commercial speech, and the protections therefore afforded, see infra notes 59-79, and
related text.
59. Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Protection of Commercial Speech Under First
Amendment-Supreme Court Cases, 164 A.L.R. FED. 1, § 2 (2000).
60. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
61. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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that is, wholly truthful speech that does not invite speculation-
should enjoy constitutional protections.62
Still, commercial speech remains subject to greater regulation
than other kinds of speech because: (1) advertisers are well equipped
to determine the accuracy of their messages before broadcast or print;
(2) commercial speech is considered the "offspring of self interest;"
and (3) commercial speech, as a whole, is not likely to suffer if
subjected to government regulation.63  For example, because
commercial speech relates to specific products or services, the
veracity of such speech is more easily verified as it relates to those
products or services. 64 Following this rationale, the Court held that
the government may also regulate trademarks which arise in
commercial speech.65
The Supreme Court also created a framework by which to gauge
whether speech is commercial (which the government may regulated)
or noncommercial (which the government may not regulate). 66  In
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, the Supreme Court stated that it
would employ "a common sense approach" to separating commercial
speech from other kinds of speech.67  In Bolger v. Youngs Drug
62. Wooster, supra note 59 (citing generally Bigelow, 421 U.S. 809 and Va. State
Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748) (speaking about level of protection offered to purely
commercial speech).
63. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y. (Cent.
Hudson), 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980) (demonstrating that federal government may
regulate commercial speech where such speech is more likely to deceive public than
inform it); Wooster, supra note 59 (describing commercial speech as "the offspring of
economic self-interest .... ); see generally Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977)
(holding that government regulation of commercial speech, which announces lawyers'
advertisements, would not hurt legal industry). Bates is one example of many. In Bates,
the Court noted that it reached a similar decision one term earlier in Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy in the context of pharmacists' advertisements. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 357-58
(detailing plurality opinion in Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy). For a more detailed
explanation of the history and effect of affording commercial speech different protections
than noncommercial speech, see generally David F. McGowan, A Critical Analysis of
Commercial Speech, 78 CAL. L. REV. 359 (1990).
64. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 n.5. (demonstrating why government
regulation of commercial speech is per se constitutional).
65. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1979) (holding that prohibition on
optometry practice under trade name was constitutionally permissible as regulation of
commercial speech).
66. For an explanation of the Supreme Court's test, see infra notes 67-68 and related
text.
67. 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978). Legal Ethics texts often cite Ohralik for the
proposition that lawyers may not directly solicit clients. See, e.g., LISA G. LERMAN AND
PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 799-800 (2d ed.
2008). Nevertheless, practitioners may also cite Ohralik for the proposition that courts
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Products Corp., the Court more precisely articulated a test for
commercial speech, which asks whether the communication: (1) was
an advertisement; (2) referred to specific products or services; and (3)
was economically motivated.'
The Third Circuit adopted the Bolger test in U.S. Healthcare, Inc.
v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia.9 In so doing, the circuit court
noted that an affirmative answer to each question strongly supports
the conclusion that the speech in question is commercial.7" Moreover,
while acknowledging that this test will not control all cases, the circuit
noted that the "commercial speech doctrine rests heavily on 'the
common sense distinction between speech proposing a commercial
transaction.., and other varieties of speech.",'
71
In instances when commercial and noncommercial speech are
"inextricably intertwined," the Supreme Court requires courts to
treat the mixture as noncommercial speech.72 Not all mixtures,
however, should be treated as noncommercial. 7 The Court held that
mixed speech should be treated as commercial speech where
noncommercial speech was merely injected into either sales calls or
advertisements.74
In the context of false endorsement cases, the Second Circuit
articulated a test for determining when mixed speech is commercial
may regulate commercial speech. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455 (noting commercial speech
is subject to both constitutional protection and legislative regulation).
68. 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 6 MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 31:141 (distilling the test into three clear
factors).
69. 898 F.2d 914, 933 (3d Cir. 1990)
70. See id.
71. Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985)
(quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56)).
72. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795-96 (1988). In
Riley, professional fundraisers called potential donors and delivered both commercial
messages (requests for donations) and noncommercial messages (information pertaining
to the nonprofit organization's mission). See id. at 787-88 (detailing nature of
"inextricably intertwined" speech). Commenting on similar situations, one author noted
that, while the underlying request for donations was economic, the speech associated with
such activity deserved full protection under the First Amendment. RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, Media Accountability and the First Amendment, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 288
(Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 2004).
73. See MCCARTHY, supra note 68 (citing Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469
(1989); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992)) (noting that "the
'inextricably intertwined' test does not apply where noncommercial speech is simply
tacked onto commercial speech that proposes a commercial transaction").
74. MCCARTHY, supra note 68.
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or noncommercial in Rogers v. Grimaldi." Actress Ginger Rogers
sued the producers and distributors of a film titled "Ginger and
Fred," alleging that the use of her name in the film title was a false
endorsement of the film. 6  There, the Second Circuit held that, to
determine whether mixed speech is commercial or noncommercial,
courts should weigh "the public interest in avoiding consumer
confusion" against "the public interest in free expression."" The
Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have adopted this test."8 Nevertheless,
courts adopting the Rogers test have generally applied the test only to
the work's title, rather than its content.79
H. As Madden Says: "Whoa!" An Account of Facenda v. NFL
Films and the Third Circuit's Analysis
John Facenda enjoyed a long career with NFL Films." Some
credit his longevity to the notable characteristics of his voice, others
75. 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). The Second Circuit's Rogers test superseded an
earlier Second Circuit ruling. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema,
Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979).
76. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996-97.
77. Id. at 999 (articulating court's test for First Amendment limitations on Lanham
Act). While finding in favor of those associated with the film, the Second Circuit stated
that:
This construction of the Lanham Act accommodates consumer and
artistic interests. It insulates ... titles with at least minimal artistic
relevance that are ambiguous or only implicitly misleading but leaves
vulnerable to claims of deception titles that are explicitly misleading as to
source or content, or that have no artistic relevance at all.
Id. at 1000.
78. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 927-28 (6th Cir. 2003)
(adopting Rogers test in Sixth Circuit); Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 448-52
(6th Cir. 2003) (same); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002)
(adopting Rogers test in Ninth Circuit); Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 269
(5th Cir. 1999) (adopting Rogers test in Fifth Circuit). The Second Circuit ratified its
Rogers decision in a notable 1989 case, Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g
Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989).
79. Compare Parks, 329 F.3d at 448-52 (applying Rogers test to song title); Mattel,
296 F.3d at 902 (applying Rogers test to song title); Sugar Busters, 177 F.3d at 269
(applying Rogers test to book title); Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 494-95 (applying Rogers test
to book title) with ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 936-39 (applying Rogers test to content of
paintings).
80. Facenda II, 542 F.3d 1007, 1011 (3rd Cir. 2008); Mike Beacom, The voice of pro
football, PROFOOTBALLWEEKLY.COM, Aug. 27,2009, http://www.profootballweekly.com
/2009/08/27/the-voice-of-pro-football (noting that Facenda started his career with NFL
Films in 1964).
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to his work ethic.81 But many consider him a legend, both in and
outside the football community. 2  To that end, NFL Films had
Facenda sign a release contract before his death, granting NFL Films
the right to use any of Facenda's prerecorded work for any purpose,
"provided [that] such use does not constitute an endorsement of any
product or service." 3
In 2005, NFL Films produced "The Making of Madden NFL 06,"
a program about the 2006 update of the popular video game. " The
twenty-two minute program aired eight times in the three days prior
to the game's retail release.85 It featured interviews with NFL players,
comparisons of video game play to prerecorded NFL sequences, and
commentary extolling the realism of many of the game's elements.
6
Notably, the program included three sentences, which Facenda earlier
recorded, lasting a total of thirteen seconds.8 NFL Films admitted
that it used the clips "to underscore the degree to which the
videogame authentically recreate[d] the NFL experience. ' 88
Facenda's estate contended that NFL Films' use of the sound clips
was a false endorsement of the video game and brought suit in the
district court.8 9 The court subsequently split the case into liability and
81. Facenda II, 542 F.3d at 1011-12 (commenting on Facenda's notoriety); The
Broadcast Pioneers of Philadelphia, supra note 2 (highlighting Facenda's work ethic).
Several NFL Films employees, when deposed, commented that Facenda's "deep baritone
voice" was distinctive, recognizable, and even legendary. Facenda I, 488 F. Supp. 2d 491,
494 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
82. See The Broadcast Pioneers of Philadelphia, supra note 2. Recognition for
Facenda's work and accomplishments stems from all corners of the broadcasting
community. See Lost Treasures of NFL Films: NFL Films Style, supra note 5 (noting that
Ed Sabol, son of NFL Films founder Steve Sabol, once commented that Facenda "may
have made a game seem more important than it was because he read lines with a dramatic
directness."). In fact, the defendant released a video of compiled clips of Facenda's voice-
over work, entitled "The Legendary John Facenda." Facenda 1, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 494
(signifying that defendant recognized plaintiff's fame).
83. Facenda II, 542 F.3d at 1012. As the court recited, the contract stated that NFL
Films enjoyed "the unequivocal rights to use" Facenda's "audio and visual film
sequences," and that the company held such rights "in perpetuity and by whatever media




87. Id. The sentences Facenda read were: (1) "Pro Football, the game for the ear and
the eye," (2) "This sport is more than spectacle, it is a game for all seasons," and (3) "X's
and O's on the blackboard are translated into aggression on the field." Id.
88. Id. (demonstrating NFL Films' defenses to Facenda's false endorsement claim).
89. Facenda 1, 488 F. Supp. 2d 491, 493, 510 (E.D. Pa. 2007). Although this case brief
focuses only on Facenda's false endorsement claim, Facenda also pursued claims under
right-of-publicity and invasion of privacy under Pennsylvania common law. Id. at 493.
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damages phases.9° Following discovery in the liability phase, both
parties moved for summary judgment, agreeing that the court could
determine liability based on the evidence presented.9' The district
court granted the Facenda estate's motion for summary judgment on
the false endorsement claim, and NFL Films appealed to the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals.92
Initially, the Third Circuit determined that the estate's false
endorsement claim arose under Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham
Act.93  It then addressed and flagged NFL Film's affirmative
defense.94  Finally, the court discussed the elements of false
endorsement claims and adopted a new eight-factor test for
determining when plaintiffs meet their burden of proof for likelihood
of confusion. 95 Subsections A and B, below, set forth the parties'
arguments and the court's analysis.
A. NFL Films Asserted That Its Production Was Artistic Speech and That
the First Amendment Thus Protected It From False Endorsement
Challenges
NFL Films argued that "The Making of Madden NFL 06" was a
documentary, and thus was artistic, rather than commercial, speech.96
In support, the company presented several independently produced
articles, which contained substantially the same information as NFL
Films' program97 It argued that, like those articles, its film only
The District Court properly had jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 1121 because of the false
endorsement claim. Facenda 11, 542 F.3d at 1013-14. This case brief does not examine the
right-of-publicity claim; and Facenda dropped his invasion of Privacy claim.
90. Facenda II, 542 F.3d at 1013.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1012-13.
93. Id. at 1014.
94. Id. at 1015-18 (detailing NFL Films' claim and court's treatment of same).
95. Id. at 1018-22.
96. Facenda 11, 542 F.3d at 1016-17.
97. Facenda 1, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 496 (referencing objective articles and critiques of
game published by L.A. TIMES, COLUMBUS POST-DISPATCH, and WALL STREET
JOURNAL). The L.A. Times article, for example, detailed the accurate game play and
cited interviews with NFL players such as Jerome Bettis. See Sam Farmer, Madden
Obsession Turns NFL Pros into Real Garners, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at Al, available
at http://articles.latimes.com/2005/dec/24/sports/sp-madden24 (explaining technical aspects
and accuracy of game). These articles, however, also noted flaws in the game. See Nick
Chordas, Mad about "Madden," COLUMBUS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 21, 2006 (criticizing
manufacturer because price of game did not reflect minimal effort put forth to update
game each year).
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served to inform the public about the game. 9' The company further
contended that, even if the program contained instances of
commercial speech, the program as a whole was noncommercial.9
NFL Films finally argued that, because the program was artistic
speech, application of the Rogers test'°° demonstrated that the
public's interest in free expression outweighed its interest in avoiding
consumer confusion. 101
Facenda's estate demonstrated that the NFL Films program was
commercial."m The estate produced evidence, which showed that
NFL Films enjoyed a contractual relationship with EA Sports, the
creator of the John Madden Football video games.3 The
relationship was such that NFL Films' parent company agreed to
provide "media, promotional and marketing support" for the video
game.1°4 The estate argued that NFL Films engaged in this contract
because it earned incrementally more money for each copy of the
video game sold. 5 The estate further contended that the NFL Films'
program was thus commercial speech.1
The Third Circuit agreed with Facenda's estate and noted that
precedent outlined a three-part test to determine whether speech was
commercial or non-commercial." 7 The test asked whether the speech:
(1) was an advertisement; (2) referred to a specific product; and (3)
was economically motivated. ' f The court further noted that "an
98. Facenda 1, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 496 (demonstrating that several objective authors
produced magazine or newspaper articles that reviewed essentially same material as NFL
Films' video).
99. Facenda 11, 542 F.3d at 1015-17 (noting NFL Films' argument that, if program
was not wholly artistic, it must be treated as such because commercial and non-commercial
aspects were inextricably intertwined). The company's argument follows the Supreme
Court's discussion of "inextricably intertwined" commercial and non-commercial speech,
discussed in notes 75-79, supra, and related text.
100. For a full explanation of the Rogers test, see supra notes 75-79 and related text.
101. Facenda 11, 542 F.3d at 1015.
102. Facenda 1, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 496-97.
103. Id. at 496 (noting financial incentive for NFL Films' work on program). The
parties did not disclose the details of the financial relationship between NFL Films and
EA Sports. Id. (noting that, due to bifurcation of trial into liability and damages phases,
this information was not relevant in discovery). Nevertheless, the record clarified that the
NFL and related parties profited from increased sales of "Madden NFL 06." Id. (noting
that EA Sports paid royalties to NFL for rights to use intellectual property).
104. Id.
105. Id. (noting royalty arrangement).
106. Facenda 11, 542 F.3d at 1017 ("The estate contends that the program is
commercial speech .... ).
107. Id. ("... and we agree.").
108. Id.
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affirmative answer to all three questions provides 'strong support' for
the conclusion that the speech is commercial."'9
The court considered the first question a novel issue because the
"Madden NFL 06" program was not a traditional 30 or 60 second
advertisement."' The court thus engaged in what it referred to as a
"commonsense [sic] distinction between speech proposing a
commercial transaction... and other varieties of speech."'' . In
analyzing the issue, the court determined that the program was, at its
core, an infomercial: it focused on one product and it was repeatedly
broadcast only in the days immediately before the game's release."'
The court also determined that the program referred to a specific
product and that NFL Films had economic motivation for the speech,
thus satisfying the latter two factors.' 3 The program only referred to
one product, and NFL Films had clear economic motivation for the
program's creation and airing."' Thus, the court labeled the program
* commercial speech."5
B. The Third Circuit Hears Facenda's False Endorsement Claim Against
NFL Films
Having set aside the affirmative defense, the court determined
that, to successfully bring an action for false endorsement under
Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act, the estate had to prove that:
(1) its mark (Facenda's voice) was legally protectable; (2) it owned
the mark; and (3) NFL Films' use of the mark to identify goods or
services was likely to create confusion concerning Facenda's
sponsorship or approval of those services."6 Noting that NFL Films
did not deny that Facenda's voice was a protectable mark, nor that
109. Id. (quoting U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d 914,
933 (3d Cir. 1990)). Any combination of these factors may be determinative, as courts
must examine facts and apply the factors on a case-by-case basis.
110. Facenda II, 542 F.3d at 1017.
111. Id. (quoting In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 193 F.3d 781, 792
(3d Cir. 1999)).
112. Facenda 1I, 542 F.3d at 1017 & n.6 (3d Cir. 2008).
113. Id. at 1017.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1017-18. After determining that the program constituted commercial
speech, the court did not return to its Rogers analysis. Id. at 1018-20 (sidestepping Rogers
analysis). This was curious, given that the Rogers analysis would have further supported
the court's opinion with respect to its treatment of NFL Film's First Amendment defense.
See id. at 1015 (noting that test weighs interest in avoiding consumer confusion, which here
is seemingly high, against interest in free expression).
116. Id. at 1014 (citing Commerce Nat'l Ins. Servs., Inc., v. Commerce Ins. Agency,
Inc., 214 F.3d 431,437 (3d Cir. 2000)).
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the estate established the first two prongs, the court focused on
likelihood of confusion."7
NFL Films argued that, under the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania's analysis in Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, the estate was
required to prove actual confusion." 8 The circuit court rejected this
argument, noting that Seale stood alone in requiring evidence of
actual confusion."9 The court further speculated that the holding in
Seale was a typographical error because the opinion recited the
language of Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act, but stated the
standard for claims raised under 43(a)(1)(B)."2 °
Having decided that the estate need only prove a likelihood of
confusion rather than actual confusion, the court adopted a new set of
factors for likelihood of confusion in false endorsement cases.'21 The
court recognized that, generally, claims raised under section
43(a)(1)(A) were subject to the ten-factor test outlined in Interpace
Corp. v. Lapp for likelihood of confusion.'22 It also noted, however,
that the Lapp test was designed to compare the marks of competing
or non-competing goods and was thus "an uncomfortable fit" in false
endorsement cases.
123
Thus, the Third Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit's test for
likelihood of confusion in false endorsement cases, as set forth in
Downing, with minor changes. 24 Under the Third Circuit's reasoning,
the courts should now consider the following factors when deciding
likelihood of confusion for false endorsement claims raised under
Section 43(a): (1) the level of recognition that the plaintiff has among
the segment of society for whom the defendant's product is intended;
(2) the relatedness of the plaintiff's fame or success to the defendant's
117. Facenda 11, 542 F.3d at 1014.
118. Id. at 1021-22 (noting NFL Films' reliance on Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 964 F.
Supp. 918 (E.D. Pa. 1997)). In fact, NFL Films also relied on a series of cases decided
under Section 43(a)(1)(B), the false advertising prong of Section 43 of the Lanham Act.
Facenda 11, 542 F.3d at 1022. Those cases, however, are not controlling.
119. Facenda 11, 542 F.3d at 1022.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1019-20 (setting forth amended Lapp factors for consideration in
determining likelihood of confusion in false endorsement cases).
122. Id. (noting the factors laid out in Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463
(3d Cir. 1983)).
123. Facenda 11, 542 F.3d at 1019 ("The Lapp factors allow courts to compare the
marks of two competing or non-competing goods. But this makes Lapp an uncomfortable
fit in a false-endorsement case like this one ... ").
124. Id. at 1020 (adopting amended Lapp factors). As discussed supra at notes 50-51
and related text, the Ninth Circuit adopted this approach first. See Downing v.
Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 2001) (espousing test).
20091 "IT'S THIRD AND EIGHT!"
HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J.
product; (3) the similarity of the likeness that the defendant used to
the actual plaintiff; (4) evidence of actual confusion and the length of
time the defendant employed the allegedly infringing work before
any evidence of actual confusion arose; (5) marketing channels used;
(6) likely degree of purchaser care; (7) the defendant's intent in
selecting the plaintiff; and (8) the likelihood that the product lines will
expand.125 The court carefully noted, however, that these are only
factors to be considered and, as such, plaintiffs are not required to
show all or even a majority of them to prove their case.1
2 6
Importantly, the court clarified that, while actual confusion may be
considered as one of eight factors, plaintiffs need not prove actual
confusion in every case.'2 7
The court concluded by noting that the question of likelihood of
confusion is a genuine issue of material fact.'" Accordingly, the court
held that the district court erroneously issued the summary
judgment.2 9 The court thus vacated the district court's grant of
summary judgment and remanded the case back to the district court
for a decision consistent with the Third Circuit court of appeals'
decision.3 °
125. Facenda 11, 524 F.3d at 1019-20 (establishing new eight factor test in Third
Circuit).
126. Id. at 1019 (citing Downing, 265 F.3d at 1008) (noting that factors are not equal,
nor does each factor necessarily apply in given case).
127. Facenda 11, 524 F.3d at 1019. As the court recited, "no single factor is
dispositive." Id. at 1021.
128. Id. at 1023-24.
129. Id. at 1024. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (setting forth standard and procedure for
summary judgment).
130. Facenda 11, 524 F.3d at 1024-25. Interestingly, the Third Circuit vacated the
district court's decision and remanded for further proceeding despite the parties'
stipulation that a new jury trial was unnecessary. MVSBlawg: Filewrapper, http://www.
filewrapper.com/index.cfm/2008/9/29/Third-Circuit--False-endorsement-claims-use-modifi
ed-likelihood-of-confusion-analysis (Sep. 29, 2008, 15:49). This decision does not accord
with a recent Federal Circuit decision, where the parties made similar stipulations and the
circuit court did not remand. See id; MVSBlawg: Filewrapper, http://www.filewrapper.
com/index.cfm/2008/9/25/When-factual-inquiries-underlying-obviousness-de termination-
disputed-summary-judgment-improper (Sep. 25, 2008, 10:57) (discussing Federal Circuit's
treatment of similar fact pattern).
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IH. Play Calling from the Sidelines: Analysis of the Court's
Decision and Advice for Practitioners
A. Offensive Play Calling: Advice for Plaintiff's Counsel
As amended in 1988, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act allows
plaintiffs to bring a wide range of actions, all of which fall under the
general umbrella of unfair competition. '31 Specifically, plaintiffs may
pursue actions for false endorsement under the amended act, under
either subsection (a)(1)(A) or (a)(1)(B). 32 Nevertheless, Facenda
instructs that plaintiffs enjoy substantial advantages by raising false
endorsement claims under subsection (a)(1)(A)133
As demonstrated in Facenda, Third Circuit plaintiffs must meet
the three-prong test for all false endorsement cases. 34 As outlined,
plaintiffs must prove that their mark is legally protectable, that they
own the mark, and that the defendant's use of the mark is likely to
create consumer confusion.'35 In turn, this section analyzes how
plaintiffs should approach Section 43(a) false endorsement claims.
As to the first factor-demonstrating that a plaintiff's mark is
legally protectable-courts have demonstrated a willingness to
interpret "marks" and "symbols" rather broadly.1 36  While leading
trademark law experts note that some courts hesitate to recognize
aural work as protectable marks, Facenda and its progeny
demonstrate that sounds and voices are protectable. 37  After
131. See generally MCKENNEY & LONG III, supra note 15 (reviewing history of,
amendment of, and various unfair competition causes of action under Section 43(a) of
Lanham Act).
132. Facenda 11, 542 F.3d at 1021 (citing 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 28.15, at
28-20) (recognizing that "[b]oth prongs of the post-1989 version of § 43(a) would seem to
be implicated in false endorsement cases."). Subsection 43(a)(1)(A) covers claims of
unfair competition, while subsection 43(a)(1)(B) covers claims of false advertising and
promotion. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(a)(1)(A)-(B).
133. For discussion of plaintiffs' advantages in bringing a false endorsement claim
under Section 43(a)(1)(A) rather than Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, see infra
notes 145-52 and related text.
134. Facenda 11, 542 F.3d at 1014.
135. Id.
136. See Mishawaka Mfg. Co. v. Kresge. Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942) (instructing that
trademarks are broad symbols which represent businesses, goods, or services); Facenda II,
542 F.3d at 1014 (recognizing that courts demonstrate willingness to broadly interpret
marks and symbols); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1992)
(recognizing broad judicial interpretation of terms name, symbol, and device).
137. See MCKENNEY & LONG III, supra note 15, at 7:3 (noting that section 43(a) did
not protect simulations of celebrity's voice). Nevertheless, courts have demonstrated a
willingness to extend broad trademark protection to aural works. See Waits, 978 F.2d at
1106-07 (recognizing judicial willingness to broadly interpret marks and symbols); see
2009]
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Facenda, plaintiffs in the Third Circuit enjoy the home field
advantage. "
Facenda provides more guidance on the third prong of the test.'39
As discussed above, plaintiffs may bring false endorsement cases
under either subsection 43(a)(1)(A) or (a)(1)(B) of the Lanham
Act.' ° But plaintiffs enjoy significant advantages by bringing claims
under 43(a)(1)(A), rather than (a)(1)(B), as the former requires
proof of a likelihood of confusion and the latter requires proof of
actual confusion.
14 1
Plaintiffs who bring false endorsement claims under Section
43(a)(1)(A) should also recognize that none of the eight factors for
likelihood of confusion are determinative. 142 Further, in some cases,
some of the eight factors may not apply.1 43  Accordingly, plaintiffs
should focus their argument on the factors that most strongly prove
their case. Each argument presents a colorable question of fact."
Plaintiffs thus have an opportunity to advocate for their clients based
on the best facts and circumstances available.
B. A Defensive Playbook: Advice for Defense Counsel
The best advice for any defendant is to apply pressure to the
offense.145  Defense counsel should advocate for application of
Section 43(a)(1)(B), rather than Section 43(a)(1)(A), thereby forcing
generally Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (demonstrating Ninth
Circuit's willingness to treat established songstress' voice as trademark); see Facenda I,
542 F.3d at 1014 (demonstrating Third Circuit's willingness to treat John Facenda's voice
as trademark).
138. For a greater description and explanation of the advantages Third Circuit
plaintiffs enjoy after Facenda, see infra notes 139-44 and related text.
139. See Facenda II, 542 F.3d at 1014 (recognizing that opinion focuses on third prong
of false endorsement test, likelihood of confusion).
140. For discussion of plaintiffs' rights to bring false endorsement claims under either
Section 43(a)(1)(A) or 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, see supra notes 139-41 and related
text.
141. Facenda II, 542 F.3d at 1018-22.
142. Id. at 1019-20. As noted in Facenda, although these factors "are appropriate for
consideration in determining the likelihood of confusion, they are not necessarily of equal
importance, nor do they necessarily apply to every case." Id. at 1020.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1024-25 (recognizing that question of likelihood of confusion presents
question of material fact).
145. See Coach Bios - Philadelphia Eagles, http://www.philadelphiaeagles.com/team
/CoachBios.asp?coachid=3 (last visited Feb. 8, 2009) (noting that Jim Johnson, one of
most revered defensive coaches in NFL, succeeds by applying pressure to offense). The
same is generally true in the legal context, where a defendant's best argument is often to
disprove the plaintiff's cause of action.
the plaintiff to provide evidence of actual confusion.' As
demonstrated in Facenda, this strategy may prove more successful
where plaintiffs raise ambiguous complaints. 147  Further, should
plaintiff's counsel raise a false endorsement claim under Section
43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act, defense counsel should first attack
the claim based on the three part test articulated in Facenda for all
false endorsement claims, and then on the eight factors espoused to
prove likelihood of confusion.
148
Most defendants, however, are ill-advised to raise a First
Amendment defense to false endorsement claims under either part of
Section 43.149 Facenda, and the Supreme Court cases which preceded
it, instruct that the government maintains a valid interest in regulating
commercial speech that may mislead consumers." ° Accordingly, to
press such a defense, counsel must show that the speech in question is
either wholly artistic or, under the Rogers test, was created such that
the public interest in free speech outweighs the public interest in
avoiding consumer confusion."' With Facenda as a guide, this
argument will likely not succeed in the Third Circuit."2
146. Facenda 11, 542 F.3d at 1021 (instructing that claims brought under section
43(a)(1)(B) of Lanham Act for misleading advertisements require showing of actual
confusion).
147. Id. (noting that Third Circuit would not "muddle" case law for Sections
43(a)(1)(A) and (B) where complaint clearly implicated 43(a)(1)(A)).
148. Id. (outlining elements and factors court must examine in false endorsement
claims raised under Section 43(a)(1)(A) of Lanham Act). As discussed at note 145, supra,
a defendant's best argument is often to simply disprove the plaintiff's case.
149. Facenda 11, 542 F.3d at 1015-18 (demonstrating relative ineffectiveness of First
Amendment attacks on Lanham Act claims). For further discussion of commercial speech
classifications and the government's right to regulate commercial speech, see supra notes
59-74 and related text.
150. For an overview of the Supreme Court cases that informed Facenda, see supra
notes 59-74 and related text. For Third Circuit instruction on the same, see Facenda H,
542 F.3d at 1014-18 (demonstrating court's reluctance to allow First Amendment defense
to false endorsement claims raised under Lanham Act).
151. For a description of the Rogers test, see supra notes 75-79 and related text. As
applied to Facenda, see Facenda 11, 542 F.3d at 1015-17 (demonstrating that courts pen
artistic speech opinions differently). Once the Third Circuit determined that "The Making
of Madden NFL 06" was commercial speech, it rejected the defendant's First Amendment
defense. See id. at 1017-19 (determining that program was commercial speech and failing
to return to Rogers analysis). Seemingly, had the opinion rested on artistic speech, the
defendant may have won.
152. For an explanation of the Third Circuit's analysis and advice for defendants in
such cases, see supra notes 24-26, 40-42, 48-55, 59-79 and related text.
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IV. Post-Game Highlights: Reflections on Facenda and
Predictions for the Future
Facenda once recited that "the Autumn Wind is a Raider,
Pillaging just for fun-He'll knock you 'round and upside down and
laugh when he's conquered and won."'5 3 Similarly, the Third Circuit
analysis in Facenda allows plaintiffs to raid, lording superior legal
arguments over opposing counsel.' 54 Facenda provides a playbook for
false endorsement claimants and, as any good referee might, flags the
defense when it steps over the line. 155
153. See Oakland Raiderfans Network, Your Raiders Port-O-Call, supra note 1
(reciting "The Autumn Wind").
154. For discussion of the plaintiff's "home field advantage" when raising false
endorsement claims under Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act in the Third Circuit,
see supra notes 141-57 and related text.
155. For the Third Circuit's analysis in Facenda, see supra notes 115-40 and related
text. See also Sherri Hunter, NFL Called for Unsportsmanlike Conduct in Voiceover Use
to Promote Video Game, MEDIA LAW BULLETIN (Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold,
LLP), Dec. 2008, at 1, available at http://www.sdma.com/nfl-called-for-unsportsmanlike-
conduct-in-voiceover-use-to-promote-video-game-12-30-2008/ (noting that "Third Circuit
threw a penalty flag on the NFL's play.").
